Introduction
The year 2014 will be remembered as a year of considerable change in the banking field. It saw the coming into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) -the EU's 'first step towards a banking union'.
1 The SSM will place the European Central Bank (ECB) at the heart of a new system of banking supervision. 2 It will bring about a higher level of integration in supervision. Crucially, however, it will not cover the whole of the EU. It will be limited to Eurozone countries and (non-euro) Member
States that decide to join the SSM.
Because of its limited scope, the SSM is also an example of differentiated integration. A term of many meanings, 3 it describes the basic idea of variation among states which pursue integration: some deciding to join in initiatives advancing integration of which others decide to abstain. In the context of the SSM, those latter
Member States (non-participating Member States or NoPS) will not be part of the SSM. Yet, their interactions with the SSM will nonetheless be close: that is, within the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) which covers the whole of the EU and especially within the European Banking Authority (EBA) which is part of the ESFS and which, unlike the SSM, brings together competent authorities from all of the twenty-eight Member States. The point about these interactions is worth noting.
They prompted the EU legislature to review the regulation governing EBA (the EBA Regulation) and to amend its voting arrangements substantially. 4 The aim of this paper is to reflect on these changes and in this process to map out alternatives for EBA. The changes which the EU legislature adopted are open to criticism. They are short sighted and fail to give sufficient consideration to the functioning of EBA. This chapter therefore evaluates alternative approaches. The aim is to find a better balance between the interests of Member States, whose competent authorities are the main decision-makers in EBA, and the proper functioning of EBA. Specifically, it is argued that the way forward is to rethink EBA's governance more fundamentally. This chapter will set out the basic requirements of such an approach.
Underpinning much of the discussion that follows are a number of observations about differentiated integration and the changes that were made to the EBA Regulation. At the outset, it is important to appreciate that whilst differentiated integration is a means to accommodate heterogeneous preferences for closer integration, it is also a likely source of tension between Member States. NoPS for example are likely to be concerned about externalities associated with differentiated integration. But they are also likely to concerned about the potential political costs of deciding to abstain from participation in closer integration. Specifically, NoPS such as the UK are concerned about a possible loss of influence in EU decision-making fora.
They fear the prospect of 'caucusing' among states participating in closer integration.
It is this sort of reasoning which explains the thinking behind the recent changes to the EBA Regulation. For the UK, the fact that a majority of EBA members would originate from SSM Member States meant that its interests in EBA were at risk. The asymmetry between NoPS and SSM members within EBA's Board of Supervisors demanded therefore substantial changes, a view which was ultimately accepted by the EU legislature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by presenting the SSM and the ESFS and especially the role of the ECB and EBA under the SSM and the ESFS respectively. Section 3 goes on to examine the way in which the EU legislature dealt with the concerns of NoPS. Given the importance of EBA as a place of interaction between NoPS and SSM members, it will mostly focus on the changes that were made to the EBA Regulation. Section 4 discusses alternative solutions for dealing with the SSM problematic within EBA. Section 5 concludes.
The Single Supervisory Mechanism and the European System of Financial

Supervision: introducing the ECB and EBA
The aim of this section is to present the SSM and the ESFS, and more specifically the role of the ECB under the former (a) and the role of EBA under the latter (b). Both actors are active in the banking field. But even though they have different roles under the SSM and the ESFS respectively, the establishment of the SSM will bring them into close contact (c).
(a) The SSM and the ECB
The establishment of the SSM must be seen in light of the EU's efforts to stabilize the Eurozone following the 2007-08 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. In June 2012, Eurozone leaders called for the establishment of the SSM in order to achieve a greater level of integration in banking supervision, but also as a condition for a possible direct recapitalisation of troubled banks by the European Stability Mechanism. 5 The SSM brings together competent authorities of participating Member States. The latter are Member States of the Eurozone. However, non-euro zone Member States are also allowed to join, provided that they enter into a close cooperation arrangement with the ECB. 6 The ECB is at the heart of the SSM. It is not only responsible 'for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM', 7 but it is also a day-to-day supervisor which was vested with prudential supervisory tasks. The latter are specified in Council Regulation No 1024/2013. 8 Overall, the SSM supervisory model can be described as based on an 'uploading' and 'unloading' of supervisory tasks: 'uploading' because the ECB will directly supervise credit institutions as a result of the establishment of the SSM; 9 'unloading' because the ECB in its role as prudential supervisor will need to rely on the expertise and work of national authorities (e.g. to carry out day-to-day verifications) 10 and because the ECB will only directly supervise a fraction of credit institutions; others will continue to be supervised at national level. Thus, 'less significant' credit institutions will as a general rule be supervised by the authorities of participating Member States. 11 The significance of a credit institution is in turn determined according to criteria set out in Art. 6(4) . See also rec (38). 12 Council Regulation No 1024/2013 refers to size, importance for the economy, or significance of cross-border activities (see Art. 6(4) sub-para 1). Significance is established on an individual or consolidated basis. Note that a branch opened in a participating Member State by a credit institution established in a NoPS will also be subject to assessment as a supervised entity under the criteria set out in Art 6(4). subject to direct supervision by the ECB -in one of the following scenarios: the total value of its assets is more than 30 billion euros; the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating Member State represents more than 20% 'unless the total value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion'; or where a national competent authority notifies the ECB that it considers an institution to be of significant domestic economic relevance and the ECB, after evaluation, confirms its significance. 13 An institution must also be considered significant where public financial assistance has been requested or received 'directly from the ESFS or the ESM'. 14 The regulation also provides for the ECB to consider of its own initiative an institution to be significant in case where the latter operates across the border by way of subsidiaries in at least one participating Member States and where its cross-border assets or liabilities 'represent a significant part of its total assets or liabilities'. 15 Finally, the regulation requires the ECB to carry out its supervisory tasks in relation to the 'three most significant credit institutions' in each participating Member State 'unless justified by particular circumstances'.
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In case where banks are not subject to the ECB's direct supervision, they will continue being supervised by competent authorities of participating Member States.
But even in this case, the ECB will solely be competent to (i) authorise or withdraw the authorisation of a credit institution and (ii) assess the notifications of the acquisition and disposal of holdings in credit institutions. 17 In addition, even where direct supervision rests with national authorities, the latter are subject to the authority of the ECB, which has also an oversight role to play. 18 Indeed, the regulation goes as far as providing for a sort of ad hoc 'uploading' of oversight powers when allowing the ECB to take over the supervision of a credit institution which would otherwise be subject to national supervision. EBA is not a day-to-day supervisor. In contrast to the ECB, the EBA model is not currently based on an 'uploading' of day-to-day supervisory tasks. Instead of a fullyfledged transfer of competences, the EBA 'supervisory' 30 model is based on possible ad hoc interventions. These interventions are supposed to take place vis-à-vis competent authorities and possibly market actors in the case of (i) disagreements between competent authorities; (ii) breaches of EU law; (iii) emergency situations; or (iv) if it is necessary to temporarily ban or limit financial activities. 31 The thrust of these intervention powers is that they are binding and allow EBA to intervene in the relationship between competent authorities, or more exceptionally, in the relationship between competent authorities and market actors. However, the possibility of ad hoc interventions is nevertheless limited. The provisions are carefully worded and EBA's intervention will be subject to various conditions and requirements which are specified in the EBA Regulation and in sectoral legislation. Because of these amendments, the ECB will be subject to the authority of EBA. The latter will be able to carry out its tasks (for instance, its power to settle disagreements or to act in emergency situations) with respect to the ECB 'as in relation to the other competent authorities'. 37 The ECB will also be subject to the technical standards which EBA develops. 38 Likewise, it will be subject to EBA's guidelines and recommendations and to the provisions of the EBA Regulation on the EU supervisory 
The Establishment of the SSM: the Approach to NoPS
Section 2 introduced the ECB's and EBA's role under the SSM and the ESFS respectively. This section examines how the legislature sought to address the concerns which NoPS raised over the establishment of the SSM, especially in the context of EBA. Recall that while NoPS do not participate in the SSM, members of the SSM and NoPS participate in the ESFS and are members of EBA. This raised a number of issues for NoPS. I will begin by examining these issues (a), after which I will examine the safeguards which the legislature put in place in favour of NoPS (b).
(a) The SSM Conundrum: the NoPS' Concerns
As noted earlier, NoPS such as the UK were concerned about the impact which the SSM would have on EBA and on decision-making within EBA. 40 following the establishment of the SSM, comprise voting members from both within and outside the SSM. Furthermore, while the SSM will initially be made of the current eighteen Eurozone Member States, the membership of the SSM will increase over time: either because non-euro Member States decide to join the SSM voluntarily; or because they meet the euro entry requirements and are therefore required to join the euro. 43 In terms of EBA's membership this means that the constellation of SSM members and NoPS is asymmetrical in the Board of Supervisors and will become increasingly so in the future -hence the concern over caucusing among SSM members.
Admittedly, some might argue that the concerns of NoPS were misplaced.
They might note -rightly so -that the precise impact which the SSM will have on the behavior of EBA's members is yet unknown. 13/74) 7 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1374.pdf). More recently, the European Parliament noted in its resolution on the review of the European System of Financial Supervision that 'it has been difficult for national representatives to separate their role of head of a national competent authority and To be sure, only time will tell whether NoPS' concerns were justified. In any event, hereinafter, I will adopt assumptions similar to those which underpinned the legislative changes: i.e., that there is room for conflict between NoPS and SSM members and that the prospect of caucusing among SSM members, and the resultant marginalisation of NoPS, was a valid one. I feel free to take this approach because the aim of this chapter is not to question NoPS' assumptions about the decision-making dynamics in EBA following the establishment of the SSM, but instead to assess what ought to be done if these assumptions prove to be accurate. I will begin by examining in more detail the way in which the legislature sought to protect the (minority) interests of NoPS.
(b) The EU Legislature's Approach to NoPS
I will first examine how the EU legislature sought to protect the minority interests of NoPS (i), after which I will examine the relevant provisions critically (ii). Given our interest in EBA, I will focus on the safeguards that are found in the EBA Regulation. , http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf, paras 6 and 8)). Indeed, the regulation goes as far as saying that the ECB has a 'duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market ...' (Art. 1). the SSM by amending or adding a number of provisions. What they have in common is that they are supposed to protect the interests of NoPS as members of the EU and as members of EBA. The recitals of the EBA Amending Regulation set the tone by highlighting the importance of maintaining the unity or integrity of the internal market, the cohesion of the Union and the need to prevent discrimination.
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concerns are also reflected in the legally binding text of the regulation. Thus, following amendment, the EBA Regulation states that EBA must act 'independently, objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner, in the interests of the Union as a whole'. 53 In an attempt to ensure 'unbiased' decision-making, amendments were also made to the provisions on the use of internal panels within EBA. 54 Specifically, the mandatory use of panels was extended. Thus, EBA must now convene a panel when it seeks to use its powers to police breaches of EU law. 55 The purpose of the panel is to propose a decision to the Board of Supervisors. Before amendment, the EBA regulation already provided for the Board of Supervisors to rely on panels. But a panel only had to be convened when EBA used its powers to settle disagreements. As we have seen in the previous sub-section, closer integration led to a rethink of the voting arrangements in EBA. To fully appreciate the issues which these changes raise, it is worth contrasting the changes which the EU legislature adopted with those that the Commission proposed. In its proposal, the Commission sought to rely more on sub-delegation. It proposed to strengthen the role of independent panels.
72 Panels would be required to propose decisions to the Board because it will make it more complicated to impose decisions in the face of differences between competent authorities.
Hence, in short, the Commission's proposed response to closer integration among Eurozone members was to put greater emphasis on a 'sub-delegation' and to weaken the influence of EBA's Board of Supervisors in the process. However, the Commission failed to deal comprehensively with the issues raised by closer integration when proposing revisions to the voting arrangements. For the EU legislature, closer integration meant that the national influence over EBA had to be maintained if not strengthened. As a result, the EU legislature reaffirmed the influence of EBA's Board of Supervisors over EBA. In conclusion, it can be suggested that closer integration among SSM members has brought about a change of thinking: whilst in the past the EU legislature was concerned about putting in place modalities for ensuring that the ESAs could make decisions in the face of divisions between their members (e.g. simple majority voting, no consensus requirement), the more recent changes suggest that the EU legislature now considers that divisions in EBA are an inevitable outcome of closer integration among SSM members and that protecting the interests of Member States, especially the minority interests of NoPS, justifies the potential costs associated with new, more burdensome, decision-making arrangements (double majority system; soft consensus requirement).
-failure to differentiate meaningfully between the interests of Member States and the proper functioning of EBA
It is plain that from an EU point of view, the legislature's concern with Member State interests is not unproblematic. The new decision-making arrangements might well be at the expense of the effective functioning of an EU body (EBA). However for the EU legislature, it was no cause for concern. From its perspective, the point was simply EBA depends for its operation on the rules that are set out therein; it owes its existence to it. Among other things, the regulation defines requirements and rules which EBA must observe when exercising its statutory tasks and in doing so sets constraints on the choices that competent authorities, as voting members of EBA, can make when exercising their decision-making powers. Article 1(5) lays down the basic requirements which EBA must satisfy. Pursuant to this provision, EBA is meant to act independently, objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner when exercising its tasks. Importantly, it must also act 'in the interests of the Union as a whole'. Hence, the question of whether EBA functions properly should be assessed in light of the requirements of Article 1(5). They essentially establish a baseline for assessing acceptable EBA behaviour and in doing so allow determining whether EBA functions properly. Moreover, these requirements are by no means trivial. Principles such as independence, objectivity, or indeed the requirement to act in the EU interest are not unique to EBA. They reflect more deep-rooted expectations about the behaviour of agencies or other EU bodies. 84 Given their importance, they are unlikely to be called into question by the EU legislature.
However, once we accept that the proper functioning of EBA should be determined along the above lines, the legislature's approach to decision-making in EBA suffers from a serious weakness: it is difficult to resolve successfully the conundrum of giving proper consideration to the interests of M-Ss (especially, the Union as a whole and will therefore not contribute to the proper functioning of EBA.
Alternative Approaches
It is useful to begin by summarising our argument so far. The previous section examined the changes which the EU legislature made to EBA's founding regulation in order to protect Member State interests', especially the minority interests of NoPS.
I criticised the legislature for failing to differentiate meaningfully between two objectives: taking account of Member State interests (especially, protecting the minority interests of NoPS against the majority interests of the SSM) and ensuring that EBA can function properly. In this context, I submitted that the safeguards which the legislature adopted (i.e., a double-majority system and a 'soft' consensus principle) did not offer a proper balance between these two objectives. I concluded by noting that that the new decision-making arrangements in EBA complicated (at best) decision-making and if the number of NoPS continued to fall, the voting arrangements would increasingly be unfit for purpose. None of this is in the interest of 85 See also e.g., Enria, supra n. 32, noting in relation to the new voting modalities that '[i]n order to protect national interests, we risk not being able to decide at the European level when this is most needed'); Demarigny, McMahon and Robert, supra n. 48 at 33, noting with regard to the doublemajority requirement that it 'does not contribute to a more independent and EU interest orientated vote by members'). 86 Recall that the number of NoPS is expected to diminish over time, as Member States join the euro or decide to join the SSM voluntarily. 87 Admittedly, this did not escape the attention of the legislature. See the review clause in Art. 81a EBA Regulation.
the Union as a whole and as such does not contribute to the proper functioning of EBA. This section evaluates alternative ways for dealing with the above objectives.
The aim is to find a better balance between them.
I will consider two types of strategies: fitting EBA's functions to its governance (hence varying its functions) (a) or fitting its governance to its functions (hence varying its governance structure) (b). I will argue that the main weakness of the first strategy is that it is inadequate for addressing relevant issues or that it simply concedes that the ESA model has failed. The main weakness of the second strategy is that it demands significant concessions from Member States which might prove a step too far for NoPS in particular.
(a) Varying EBA's Functions: Fitting Functions to Governance
Under this first approach, the current EBA governance model, which vests overwhelmingly decision-making powers in national authorities, is maintained.
However, instead of relying on cumbersome voting arrangements such as the doublemajority system, EBA's functions are reassessed following the establishment of the SSM. This re-assessment also extends to the requirements which EBA members ought to satisfy when carrying out these functions. I will start with these requirements, which I will call 'rules of conduct'.
(i) Setting 'Rules of Conduct'?
'Rules of conduct' might a priori be a first possible line of response to closer integration among SSM members. (ii) Allowing for Dissenting Views?
The EU legislature might also consider taking more drastic action. For example, it might allow competent authorities, which hold minority views, to adopt dissenting views within EBA: for instance, on draft technical standards. 92 Recall that EBA adopts these draft standards in order to contribute to a single rulebook. Allowing for dissenting views could be an effective means to deal with caucusing among SSM members. It might also contribute to resolving bottlenecks and hence allow decisionmaking to progress in all other matters in the interest of the Union as a whole.
However, here too, there are complications. First of all, dissenting views on draft standards would have no binding force unless the Commission would endorse them together with the draft technical standards to which they relate. Furthermore, it is plain that a system based on dissenting views would threaten to exacerbate differences between NoPS and SSM members. Crucially, such a system would risk undermining the so-called single rulebook, which as an objective, is closely associated with the establishment of the ESFS. 93 A fragmented rulebook would in turn be difficult to reconcile with a basic principle underpinning the SSM: that is, preserving the unity and integrity of the internal market. The latter is a principle that the UK sought to uphold during the negotiations, but which was also endorsed by the 91 See in this context the Court's approach to enhanced cooperation and especially its 'hands-off' approach to the requirement imposed on the Council to adopt a decision authorizing enhanced cooperation 'as a last resort'. See Joined cases C-274/11 and C-295/ in the future; the latter being at the heart of the SSM and as such at the heart of the concerns of its members. 96 The point is that EBA will find it difficult to act independently, objectively and in the interest of the Union as a whole if its intervention powers are targeted at those that decide over them. However, simply abolishing some or all of EBA's intervention powers in response to this conundrum is not an attractive solution either. The ESA's intervention powers were among the main innovations introduced under the ESFS.
Abandoning them would in many ways leave the ESFS toothless. Meanwhile, the issues which they were meant to address -e.g. a lack of cooperation between competent authorities or a lack of consistency in a crisis situation -and which the establishment of the SSM might come to exacerbate would remain unaddressed.
(b) Varying EBA's Governance: Fitting Governance to Functions
In the preceding part, I found fault with all of the contemplated strategies. This section considers a different approach to the post-SSM conundrum. Under this approach, EBA's functions are maintained but its governance model is reassessed.
Specifically the proposal is to add a group of appointed members -I will refer to them as trustees -to the Board of Supervisors. Like EBA's chairperson and executive director, these members would be full-time independent professionals. Hereinafter, I will examine whether the basic idea of reorganising the Board of Supervisors and relying on appointed members has anything to offer in the context of closer integration among SSM members. 101 I will begin by considering the rationale for relying on independent appointees (or 'trustees') (i), after which I will specify their tasks (ii).
(i) Independent Appointees as Trustees
The idea of relying on independent full-time appointed members or 'trustees' is examined here as a way to improve the balance between the two objectives identified earlier: i.e., to take account of the interests of Member States in a post-SSM world (especially, NoPS' interests not to be marginalised by a majority of SSM members in EBA) and ensuring that EBA can function properly. The notion of 'trustee' is borrowed from Majone who looked at the concept when attempting to explain the thinking behind different forms of delegation. 102 For the present purposes, the analogy with the concept of trust has some usefulness, for it allows highlighting the basic characteristics of appointed members. Translated into the present context, the point is that the new EBA board members would be appointed in order to act independently and in the best interest of their sole beneficiary: that is the Union as a whole. To be sure, a strategy that relies on independent trustees might be open to criticism on a number of grounds. Some might argue that I place too much 'trust' in full-time, independent appointees. In this context, they might point out that the objective of acting in the 'interest of the Union as a whole' does not allow prescribing in advance a single specific course of action. 103 The critique is beside the point. I use the notion of trustees precisely because appointees must be capable of making independent choices. Moreover, the point about independent full-time appointees is not that they are meant to be perfectly benevolent actors but that in comparison to actors which are embedded in a national context, independent appointees (whose selfinterest is moreover closely intertwined with the fate of EBA) are comparatively more likely to identify themselves with EBA's objectives and thus to give them due consideration when deciding over different courses of action. See also European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2014 supra n. 50, noting that 'it has been difficult for national representatives to separate their role of head of a national competent authority and European decision-making challenging their ability to genuinely adhere to the requirement to act independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 42 of the ESA regulations'. 107 Admittedly, even in the absence of a national institutional affiliation, appointees still have national (Member State) origins. These origins might still be seen as having an impact on the issue of independence. It is worth noting in this context that if appointees are supposed to be judged on the basis of their independence, integrity and competence, there is no reason why they should not be third country nationals. This is all the more so for a body such as EBA which is not a policy-making body. There is some literature which examines the impact of nationality in the context of the European Commission. Egeberg differentiates between Commission officials and Commissioners (Egeberg, supra n. 105). After reviewing various studies, he notes with respect to Commission officials that even though nationality is not unimportant in all respects, 'nationality clearly plays a minor role' (ibid. 947). With regard to Commissioners, he concludes that nationality probably matters more, but 'nationality is
(ii) Tasks of Trustees
So far, I considered the basic rationale for appointing independent 'trustees' to EBA's Board of Supervisor. Ultimately, however, the merit of this approach depends on the powers which trustees are vested with. Hereinafter, I will consider the merit of a twostage approach. The basic thinking behind this approach is that the issues which the current voting arrangements raise will become more severe as the membership asymmetry between SSM members and NoPS in EBA's Board of Supervisors increases.
-first stage
As noted, initially, we assume that the membership asymmetry between NoPS and SSM members in EBA is not too great. To address this conundrum, it is suggested that the role of trustees be reassessed at this stage. A possible way forward is for them to become more actively involved in decision-making in the Board of Supervisors. Specifically, trustees should be given the right to vote alongside competent authorities. The guiding principle underpinning such a change was repeatedly mentioned: to find a better balance between (i) ensuring that EBA can function properly and (ii) making sure that the interests of Member States are taken into account. Whilst the first objective pleads against maintaining the current voting modalities once the composition of the board is highly asymmetrical, the second rules out a wholesale transfer of decision-making powers to trustees. Thus, to improve the balance of interests, it is suggested that the temporary interventions and other decisions are taken by the Management Board with, in certain cases a right for the Board of Supervisors to object to the Management Boards proposal' (European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2014 (supra n. 49). 112 The fact that reforms to the voting arrangements might be necessary is also reflected in Art. 81a EBA Regulation which provides that if the number of NoPS drops to four, the Commission needs to review the operation of EBA's voting arrangements.
crux of this approach is that a decision would no longer necessarily require votes from both NoPS and SSM members. Under the proposed voting system, an EBA decision could be adopted with either the support of SSM members or NoPS, provided that a decision would also have the unanimous support of trustees. Such a system would arguably be superior for a number of reasons. For one thing, NoPS would continue benefiting from a double-majority requirement (or a similar arrangement which seeks to protect the say of NoPS by differentiating between them and SSM members for voting purposes) 114 in their interactions with SSM members. In particular, the requirement would continue protecting any remaining NoPS from the SSM's in-built majority in EBA. At the same time, however, the new voting system would allow mitigating the effects of an increasingly asymmetrical Board of Supervisors.
Specifically, the new modalities would contribute to preventing a very small number of NoPS from having a disproportionate say over EBA's actions. An EBA decision could henceforth be adopted with the support of a majority of SSM members, provided that such a decision would benefit from the unanimous support of trustees. 115 Moreover, by allowing EBA to adopt a decision in this way, the proposed voting modalities would contribute to resolving any bottlenecks which may come to obstruct decision-making under the current voting system. Trustees would be held to decide unanimously in order to give their decisions greater legitimacy. Moreover, 113 Or a similar arrangement which seeks to protect the say of NoPS by differentiating between them and SSM members for voting purposes. Recall that the number of NoPS may well fall to one. Insisting on a majority of NoPS would not make much sense in this case. 114 See supra n. 113. 115 Equally, of course, a decision could be adopted if it had the support of NoPS and the unanimous support of trustees.
their duty to act in the sole interest of the Union as a whole would rule out any action or decision which would be bluntly in favour of either the SSM or NoPS.
It is important to stress that a more active involvement of trustees would not prevent NoPS and SSM members from reaching common decisions without the support of trustees. Moreover, trustees would have no power to make decisions unilaterally, except as far as dispute settlement and breaches of EU law are concerned.
As argued earlier, it is in the interests of all the Member States that these powers be administered independently.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to consider ways in which EBA could move forward in the wake of the establishment of the SSM. I have focused on defining the basic principles of an approach which seeks to rely on independent, full-time, appointed members. have put forward ambitious proposals in an effort to open a necessary debate on the future governance of EBA following the establishment of the SSM. The point is that EBA's current voting arrangements are unlikely to offer a lasting solution. They will ultimately need to be reassessed if the number of NoPS falls over time.
That said, in order to improve the odds of the proposals, a range of strategies could a priori be envisaged. Aspects such as those left open could be subject to negotiation as long as they do not undermine the basic principles outlined above.
Safeguards could be put in place or simply re-affirmed. For instance, transferring dayto-day supervisory powers to the ESAs should be ruled out. As far as Article 19
(dispute settlement) is concerned, it is also important to stress that conciliation would continue to be a first line of response. Thus competent authorities would remain free to reach an agreement on their own during an initial conciliation phase. Moreover, as far as Article 17 is concerned, the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, would obviously continue playing a pivotal role under this provision. The role of trustees would as a result be limited.
Before drawing this chapter to a close, it is worth considering one final point with respect to the UK. In this chapter, I was interested in the choices which the EU and thus the UK might come to face with regard to EBA if the UK stays in the EU as a NoPS: that is, as a state which is not, and does not intend to be, part of the SSM or the Banking Union for that matter. Hence, I was not primarily interested in assessing the consequences of a total exit by the UK of the EU. In terms of the narrative of the book, the situation which I described and examined was therefore closer to a partial withdrawal than a total withdrawal by the UK. It is plain that if the UK were to leave the EU, it would no longer be a NoPS. It would no longer be a voting member of EBA either. That is not to say, however, that the UK would necessarily be shielded from the effects of closer integration among SSM members. Externalities, for example, can be imposed on third countries just as they can be imposed on NoPS. On the other hand, in the unlikely event of the UK joining the SSM, the UK would no longer be a NoPS either. Under the SSM, it would be treated as a non-euro participating Member State. It would continue to be part of EBA, but it would also be subject to the authority of the ECB in its new role as prudential supervisor. In both cases (total exit or participation), the problematic which is discussed above would find a simple resolution, provided of course that all other (non-euro) Member States were ready to join the SSM. There would no longer be a need for complicated voting arrangements in EBA. Both scenarios (total exit or participation) remain however uncertain prospects at the time of writing.
